In an ongoing inquiry regarding the authority of the police under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C) to request and obtain specimen signatures and handwriting from the accused for expert examination, it has been established that such an act does not comprise ‘personal testimony’.
This development, confirmed in a recent decision, was made amid ongoing discourse on the very issue. The crux of the argument was that during an investigation, even a Magistrate does not possess the power to instruct the accused to provide their specimen signature upon police request. It was only with the 2005 amendment to the Cr.P.C that the Magistrate was vested with such authority, allowing them to direct anyone, including the accused, to offer their specimen signature for investigative purposes. As such, claims were made that the collection of these signatures and writings, inherently unlawful, invalidated any subsequent expert report used as evidence against the accused.
The learned Addl. Solicitor General countered this claim, citing the 1962 11-Judge Bench ruling in The State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Ors. This ruling was a reconsideration of legal propositions previously established in M.P. Sharma and Ors. v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and Ors., 1954.
The larger Bench was tasked with determining whether the production of the specimen handwriting constituted the accused bearing ‘witness against himself’ under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Further, it was to consider whether being in police custody while providing these specimens could, in isolation, be viewed as compulsion, in absence of other factors that might compromise the accused’s consent.
Their findings concluded that the act of furnishing evidence should not impede efficient and effective criminal investigations, while also protecting the accused from self-incrimination. Furthermore, the Bench clarified that providing fingerprints, signatures, or specimen handwriting, though technically classified as evidence, does not equate to ‘personal testimony’. They stressed that such elements could not change in their intrinsic character, regardless of the accused’s attempts at concealment.
Further, it was asserted that these specimen handwritings or signatures, or fingerprints, were in essence innocuous, barring instances where deliberate tampering was evident. Such material serves as comparative evidence, aiding the Court in establishing the reliability of other evidence at hand. These are not classifiable as oral or documentary evidence, but rather fall under the category of material evidence, lying outside the boundaries of ‘testimony’.
These findings gave rise to the following conclusions: the accused cannot be regarded as being compelled to testify against himself merely due to the statement being made while in police custody. It is also stressed that voluntary statements made by the accused during police questioning do not qualify as ‘compulsion’. The act of ‘being a witness’ is not synonymous with ‘furnishing evidence’, particularly in the broader sense of the term. Providing thumb impressions, specimen writings, or displaying parts of the body for identification purposes does not fall within the definition of ‘being a witness’.
In its essence, ‘being a witness’ implies providing knowledge of pertinent facts either orally or in writing, within a court setting or otherwise. ‘Being a witness’, in its fundamental sense, means providing oral testimony in court. However, legal precedents have broadened the interpretation of this term, now encompassing bearing testimony, in or out of court, by an individual accused of an offence, whether orally or in writing.
Finally, to be included in the prohibition of Article 20(3), the accused must have been regarded as such at the time of making the statement. The mere act of becoming an accused subsequent to the statement is insufficient.
