In a legal odyssey led by former Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu, the Supreme Court finds itself at crossroads over the retrospective application of Section 17A within the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. A recent split verdict has emerged, leaving the legal community in contemplation.
The crux of the matter lies in whether Section 17A, introduced in a 2018 amendment, can be applied retrospectively to offenses predating the amendment. Justice Aniruddha Bose contends that the prerequisite of prior approval under Section 17A should have retrospective effect, while Justice Bela Trivedi dissents.
Section 17A, a legislative addition from July 26, 2018, mandates that a police officer seeks prior approval from the competent authority before initiating any inquiry into alleged offenses committed by a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Naidu, facing charges related to a period preceding the 2018 amendment, sought to invalidate the investigation, arguing it lacked prior approval under Section 17A.
The pivotal dispute revolves around the commencement of the inquiry. The state argues it began with a letter dated June 5, 2018, before the amendment took effect. Naidu, on the other hand, asserts that the inquiry started only after the FIR was registered on December 9, 2021.
Justice Bose, in elucidating the meaning of inquiry, dismisses the notion that the June 5, 2018 letter initiated the inquiry, emphasizing that it merely signaled a request. He asserts that the actual search for information began in 2021.
Contrarily, Justice Trivedi relies on Standard Operating Procedures issued in September 2021, defining inquiry as any action taken to verify whether information received by a police officer pertains to an offense under the Act. She holds that the inquiry was initiated from the date of the June 5, 2018 letter.
The crux of the matter also extends to whether prior approval is required for proceedings against a public servant for offenses committed before Section 17A’s enactment.
Justice Bose interprets Section 17A as applicable without distinction for offenses pre or post-July 26, 2018. He retroactively applies Section 17A, asserting that the point of commencement is the initiation of inquiry, not the time of the alleged offense.
Justice Trivedi, however, views Section 17A as substantive, not procedural. She argues that applying it retroactively would defeat the Act’s purpose and assumes the legislature intended it to apply only to new offenses after the 2018 amendment.
In a nuanced analysis, Justice Trivedi emphasizes the cardinal principle of construction, asserting that statutes generally have prospective operation unless explicitly or implicitly retrospective. She highlights that the 2018 amendment, introducing Section 17A, was made applicable from July 26, 2018, indicating legislative intent for prospective application.
The split verdict in Nara Chandrababu Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. reflects the complexity of interpreting legal amendments and underscores the ongoing discourse surrounding the retrospective reach of legislative changes.
