Editorial correction — 28 September 2026
This article previously stated that Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan made “continuous wrong” the cornerstone of the decision and broadly extended the time to bring domestic-violence proceedings. That was inaccurate. The Supreme Court held that an application under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is not itself a prosecution for an offence to which section 468 CrPC limitation runs. The Act offence discussed by the Court is breach of an order under section 31. The Court said the Magistrate must decide on the facts whether the allegations disclose a continuing wrong; it did not make that finding for every case or decide the merits of the relief claimed.
Scope of this check: correction of the case holding only. The older comparative discussion and remaining practice suggestions have not been fully re-verified and should not be relied on without checking their authorities.
Law checked: 28 September 2026. Primary authority: Supreme Court judgment dated 13 April 2022, especially paragraphs 15 and 20–21.
This note concerns the limitation question decided in the Supreme Court’s 2022 judgment; it is not a general guide to every filing deadline or defence under the Domestic Violence Act.
What the Supreme Court decided
Section 12 provides for an application to a Magistrate seeking relief under the Act. The Court distinguished that application from the offence created by section 31 for breach of a protection order. It held that the section 468 CrPC period for an offence begins from commission of that offence; the underlying section 12 application is not itself the offence. The judgment therefore rejects treating the application as time-barred under section 468 merely because it was filed more than one year after the alleged domestic violence.
How to use the “continuing wrong” discussion
The Court did not announce a rule that every domestic-violence allegation is a continuing wrong. It held that the Magistrate must examine the allegations and record whether, on the particular facts, they disclose a continuing wrong. Do not state that the Supreme Court itself made that factual finding in every case. The holding addressed the section 468 objection and did not decide the merits of the applicant’s requested relief.
Practical file review
- Identify the relief sought and the pleaded dates and conduct; distinguish the section 12 application from any separate allegation of breach of an order under section 31.
- If limitation is raised, identify the precise offence and statutory period relied on. Do not apply section 468 to the section 12 application as though it were itself a prosecution for an offence.
- Where continuing conduct is relied on, plead the underlying facts and let the Magistrate assess them; do not substitute the label “continuing wrong” for a factual chronology.
- Check the procedural enactment applicable to the particular proceeding. Kamatchi interpreted the CrPC in 2022; it did not decide every question arising from later criminal-procedure legislation or the continued operation of references in other statutes.
Authorities
- Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan, Supreme Court, 13 April 2022, paragraphs 15, 20–21.
- Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, sections 12, 28 and 31 (official India Code text).
Automated research disclosure: this dated correction was prepared by automated comparison with the cited primary judgment; no human legal review is claimed. Next review: 28 March 2027, or earlier if an applicable statutory amendment or controlling decision is identified.
