In a recent development, the Supreme Court has embarked on a journey of legal scrutiny, thrusting into the spotlight the intricate interplay between the jurisdictional nuances of cheque dishonour cases and the implications of legislative amendments. A matter of paramount importance has surfaced: whether the amendment to Section 142A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, warrants the Union of India’s intervention, stirring the judicial pot with its nuanced complexity.
The crux of the issue lies in the aftermath of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act 26 of 2015, which introduced a specific territorial jurisdiction tethered to the bank branch where the “payee” or “holder” maintains an account. The pivotal question confronting the apex court is whether it retains the authority, under Section 406 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to transfer a complaint to the jurisdiction of a court where the drawer’s bank resides, despite the categorical prohibition delineated in the amended NI Act.
In a judicious move, the bench, comprising Justices CT Ravikumar and Aravind Kumar, discerned the indispensability of the Union of India’s involvement, citing the intricate web of interpretation and consequential ramifications woven by the amendment to Section 142A. Consequently, the Union of India finds itself thrust into the legal arena, represented by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Law and Justice, as the court seeks clarity on this pressing matter.
The genesis of this legal imbroglio traces back to the landmark ruling in Dasrath Rupsingh Rathod v State of Maharashtra (2014), wherein the Supreme Court delineated the territorial jurisdiction for filing complaints pertaining to cheque dishonour cases. However, this judicial precedent was met with legislative intervention in 2015, precipitating the insertion of Section 142(2) into the NI Act, prescribing a stringent territorial nexus tied to the bank branch of the payee.
Yet, amidst the legal labyrinth, dissenting voices have emerged, articulating concerns over the constitutional validity of the 2015 amendment. Renowned Senior Advocate Mr. Siddharth Luthra, acting as Amicus Curiae, contends that the amendment transgresses the sacrosanct principles enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. He cogently argues that the skewed legislative amendment bestows undue advantage upon the complainant, jeopardizing the accused’s fundamental right to a fair trial and equal access to justice.
Mr. Luthra’s impassioned plea resonates with the courtroom, echoing the profound inequity entrenched within the legislative framework. He underscores the inherent hardship inflicted upon the accused, compelled to traverse disparate jurisdictions in pursuit of justice, while the complainant wields unbridled discretion in forum shopping, unfettered by legislative constraints.
As the legal saga unfolds, the Supreme Court braces itself for a deliberative odyssey, navigating the convoluted terrain of legislative intent and constitutional imperatives. With the matter slated for further adjudication on July 23, 2024, the courtroom reverberates with anticipation, poised at the precipice of legal precedent and judicial pronouncement.
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